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Abstract 
Just as Lee, Briggs & Dennis (2014) showed that a rigorous conception of “explanation” leads 
to requirements for a positivist theory to satisfy, and just as Lee & Hovorka (2015) showed that a 
rigorous conception of “interpretation” leads to requirements for an interpretive theory to satisfy, 
we show that a rigorous conception of “systems” leads to certain requirements for a systems 
theory to satisfy. We apply basics of systems science in general, as well as basics of Luhmann’s 
(Luhmann, 1995; Moeller, 2006) systems perspective in particular. We illustrate these basics with 
empirical material from a case about the role of information technology in anti-money laundering. 
The example demonstrates that research in information systems, which has been informed by 
positivism, interpretivism, and design, can be additionally and beneficially informed by systems 
science – which, ironically, has been largely absent in information “systems” research. 
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What is systems science, what are requirements that systems science imposes on theorizing, 
and how can research on information systems benefit from and satisfy these requirements? A 
fundamental premise of this essay is that the academic discipline of information systems, in 
incorporating the word “systems” in its name (e.g., the Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences, Management Information Systems Quarterly), needs to take “systems” seriously. 
Ironically, this academic discipline has not availed itself of the rich intellectual heritage of systems 
science (of which some notable exceptions include the work of Peter Checkland (2000) and of 
Steven Alter (2013)). Following not only Lee, Briggs & Dennis (2014) who examined how to craft 
theory to satisfy the requirements of explanation, but also Lee & Hovorka (2015) who examined 
how to craft theory to satisfy the requirements of interpretation, we examine, in this essay, how to 
craft theory to satisfy the requirements of systems science. However, in our discussion, we will 
clarify that we shall ground our reflections on systems principles that have their origins in the 
founders of systems theory (such as Bertalanffy), where such principles are at a higher-level of 
theoretical abstraction than the specifics of any systems-oriented methodology.  
The next and second section of this essay will offer some of the basic, general, and widely 
agreed-upon features of systems science. The purpose is not to present all features of systems 
science, but to extract key ideas useful for differentiating systems theorizing from theorizing in 
positivism, interpretivism, and design so that researchers already familiar with the latter can 
perceive additional benefits and insights afforded by the former. 
The third section will present features of the specific form of systems theorizing advanced by 
Niklas Luhmann (1927-1998), a scholar whose work has been increasingly felt in the information-
systems research community. Luhmann adapted systems theory in a way that is readily useful to 
the large school of behavioral research already ensconced in the information-systems research 
community. 
In the fourth section of the essay, we will abstract, from the preceding discussion on systems 
science, requirements for systems theorizing to satisfy. 
In the fifth section, we will apply these requirements in an empirical case of systems theorizing 
about the role of information technology in anti-money laundering. 
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2. Some Basics of Systems Science in General 
 
 Diverse schools of thought characterize systems science no less than positivist science, 
interpretive science, and design science. 
In this essay, we approach systems science as an empirical science where its object of study is 
systems in general, rather than systems of specific types, such as social systems, computer systems, 
and ecological systems (Klir, 2013). Therefore, statements that systems science makes about 
“systems” would be applicable across systems of specific types. In fact, the vision of the founders 
of the Society for General Systems Research in 1954 – Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1950), Kenneth 
Boulding (1956), James Grier Miller (1978) and Anatol Rapoport (1950) – was exactly that: the 
gradual development of a science that would synthesize fundamental principles from different 
fields. It was the idea of a science that would evolve into a sort of meta-theory through which a 
diverse array of different phenomena – across different systems – would be described, modeled, 
and investigated. Hammond (2003), who traced the evolution of systems theory in her work on the 
history of systems theorizing, called the whole endeavor a science of synthesis. 
Indicative of the long history of systems science and its relation to information is Leo Szilard’s 
1929 paper (Szilard, 1964), which exposed the difference between matter/energy and information, 
and from which the cybernetics paradigm eventually emerged. Also, it is generally acknowledged 
that Shannon and Weaver’s The Mathematical Theory of Communication (Shannon & Weaver, 
1949) is second only to Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics (Wiener, 1948) in establishing concepts for 
the evolution of systems thinking (including information, communication, and of course, 
feedback). Thus, the groundwork has already been laid for definitively establishing connections 
and identifying common core principles between systems science and the study of information 
systems. 
Systems science is also known as “General Systems Theory” (GST). Overlapping versions of 
GST were rendered by Bertalanffy (1950), Boulding (1956), and others. Boulding emphasizes its 
generality by describing it as (Boulding, 1956, p. 208) “the skeleton of science in the sense that it 
aims to provide a framework or structure of systems on which to hang the flesh and blood of 
particular disciplines and particular subject matters in an orderly and coherent corpus of 
knowledge.” 
What, then, is a “system”? According to Bertalanffy (1950, p. 143): 
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A system can be defined as a complex of interacting elements p1, p2 … pn. Interaction 
means that the elements stand in a certain relation, R, so that their behaviour in R is 
different from their behavior in an another relation, R'. On the other hand, if the behavior 
in in R and R' is not different, there is no interaction, and the elements behave 
independently with respect to the relations R and R'. 
 
As succinct as Bertalanffy’s definition might be, it has ramifications of major significance that 
emerge when made explicit. Hegel, according to Skyttner (2005, pp.49-50)  
…formulated the following statements concerning the nature of systems. 
• The whole is more than the sum of the parts [e.g., Bertalanffy’s p1, p2 … pn]. 
• The whole defines the nature of the parts. 
• The parts cannot be understood by studying the whole. 
• The parts are dynamically interrelated or interdependent.  
 
Skyttner, moreover, offers a summary of properties of general systems for which he credits 
Bertalanffy, Litterer, and others (Skyttner, 2005, p.53): 
 
 Interrelationship and interdependence of objects and their attributes: Unrelated 
and independent elements can never constitute a system. 
• Holism: Holistic properties not possible to detect by analysis should be possible to 
define in the system. 
• Goal seeking: Systemic interaction must result in some goal or final state to be reached 
or some equilibrium point being approached. 
• Transformation process: All systems, if they are to attain their goal, must transform 
inputs into outputs. In living systems this transformation is mainly of a cyclical nature. 
• Inputs and outputs: In a closed system the inputs are determined once and for all; in 
an open system additional inputs are admitted from its environment. 
… 
• Regulation: The interrelated objects constituting the system must be regulated in some 
fashion so that its goals can be realized. Regulation implies that necessary deviations 
will be detected and corrected. …  
• Hierarchy: Systems are generally complex wholes made up of smaller subsystems. 
This nesting of systems within other systems is what is implied by hierarchy. 
• Differentiation: In complex systems, specialized units perform specialized functions. 
This is a characteristic of all complex systems and may also be called specialization or 
division of labour. 
• Equifinality and multifinality: Open systems have equally valid alternative ways of 
attaining the same objectives from different initial conditions (convergence) or, from a 
given initial state, obtain different and mutually exclusive, objectives (divergence).  
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The ramifications in the preceding two lists can all be considered to be detailed restatements or 
elaborations of Bertalanffy’s succinct definition of “system.” 
Worth emphasizing are systems science’s three interrelated features that “the whole is more 
than the sum of the parts,” “the parts are dynamically interrelated or interdependent,” and “holistic 
properties not possible to detect by analysis should be possible to define in the system.”  These 
three features have ramifications that serve to distinguish, in two major ways, systems theorizing 
from positivist theorizing in information systems (IS) research. 
The first major way in which systems theorizing is distinguished from positivist IS research is 
that systems theorizing breaks outside of the boxes-and-arrows depictions to which much positivist 
IS research is beholden. The latter typically operationalizes theories in the form of multivariate 
statistical models and visually presents them in the form of boxes-and-arrows diagrams; the boxes 
denote variables and the arrows denote causal relationships between them, where the arrows may 
point in only one direction between each pair of variables. Such diagrams are merely visual 
representations of mathematical equations, where each dependent variable is a box, each 
independent variable is a box, and an arrow is drawn from an independent variable to a dependent 
variable where there is a relationship between the two variables. In systems theorizing, however, 
what positivist IS research considers to be a dependent variable “Y,” which is determined by 
independent variables such as “X1” and “X2,” may also act, recursively, to determine “X1” and 
“X2.” In fact, any specified system can acquire information about its own functioning and this can 
then contribute towards a change of its functioning. Indeed, in systems theory, the very ontology 
of an “independent” variable is paradoxical! In other words, the unidirectional relationships in 
positivist IS research gives way to bidirectional or recursive relationships in systems theorizing, 
which are more realistic but also too mathematically intractable to be incorporated into the 
multivariate statistical models (typically, regression models and structural equation modeling) 
used in positivist IS research. Indeed, the infeasibility of modeling, and the resulting absence of, 
bidirectional or recursive relationships throughout almost all positivist IS research precludes it 
from qualifying as truly systems research. 
The classic form of the technology acceptance model (Davis, Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1989) 
provides a good baseline to illustrate what would need to be changed for theorizing to be rendered 
into systems theorizing. We mention just four key points here. First, in order to collect data on the 
impacts that the different elements making up a system have on each other, which are impacts over 
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time, the data collection would need to be longitudinal; on this measure alone, the cross-sectional 
approaches taken in many technology acceptance studies would simply fall short of systems 
theorizing. Positivist research may, in principle, also be longitudinal, but in the practice of 
statistical research in information systems, this is more often than not the exception. Second, each 
pairwise relationship in which one variable influences another (e.g., a person’s perceived 
usefulness of a technology influencing the person’s attitude towards using the technology) would 
also open up the need to examine any interactive effects, including reflexive effects and feedback 
effects (here, the same person’s attitude towards using the technology influencing back the 
person’s perceived usefulness of the technology), which, again, would require longitudinal 
observation. Third, the level of impact of one element on another (e.g., the effect size, or the 
numerical estimate of a coefficient of an independent variable’s effect on a dependent variable) is 
not a constant, but can change over time as different elements influence one another. And fourth, 
each subsystem (represented in a technology acceptance model equation, such as BI = ß0 + ß1A + 
ß2U)1 can itself change over time (e.g., linear relationships can become nonlinear, new variables 
can enter an equation, old variables can drop out, interactive or moderating variables can enter), 
so that the result is a dynamic technology acceptance model. 
The second major way in which systems theorizing is distinguished from positivist IS research 
is that positivist IS research regards alternative ways of explaining the same phenomenon to be 
competing explanations or competing theories, of which at most one may survive as the right one, 
whereas systems theorizing (through its feature of equifinality) routinely accepts such alternatives 
as pathways carved out by different observers (in particular, different observing researchers) that 
lead to the same result, where typically more than just one of the pathways is regarded as feasible. 
This idea bypasses the problem-solution duality and focuses more on the description of systems 
as observer-designated connections between elements and their relations. Systems theorizing 
recognizes that if a problem “uniquely prescribed its solution, it would evoke its one and only 
(dis)solution” (Rossbach, 1993) .  
Reflecting the contrast between positivist IS research and systems theorizing is the difference 
between analyzing and synthesizing. To analyze is to break down an entity down into the parts that 
                                                 
1 BI is behavioral intention.  A is attitude towards using the technology.  U is perceived 
usefulness of the technology.  Each ßi is a constant. 
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make it up, where the goal of the analysis is to understand each part. On the other hand, to 
synthesize is not to break down, but to build up and combine, where the goal of the synthesis is to 
understand the resulting whole. Positivist IS research is marked by analysis and systems theorizing 
is marked by synthesis. 
Interpretive theorizing would, in principle, appear to be marked by synthesis, just as systems 
theorizing is. Consider that what Klein & Myers call “the fundamental principle of the hermeneutic 
circle” (Klein & Myers, 1999, pp. 71-73) explicitly recognizes that the whole (whether the whole 
of a text or a text analog) is greater than the sum of its parts. This is the recognition that the meaning 
of a text, as a whole, is not merely the sum total of the meanings of its individual words, but instead 
is synthesized, even variously by different observers, from the web of relationships among the 
words. On the other hand, there are few instances of information systems research where, apart 
from simply being mentioned, the principle of the hermeneutic circle is explicitly operationalized 
and applied (one instance is found in Sarker & Lee (2002)). 
However, while interpretive theorizing is closer to systems theorizing than positivism, we need 
to recognize differences within systems theorizing itself that may assist us further in reflecting on 
the relationship between interpretivism and systems theory. For example, “while systems thinking 
is generally associated with the functionalist school of thought, the general-systems group drew 
from both interpretive and pragmatist traditions” (Hammond, 2003, p.24). Thus, general systems 
theory acquires a higher degree of conceptual abstraction and therefore rests above specific 
epistemologies (and as we point out later on, it is not necessarily incompatible with either the 
positivist or the interpretive tradition).  
Another difference between interpretive theorizing and systems theorizing can be highlighted 
in the context of how the role of the observer is considered within them. Whereas there are clear 
parallels in both traditions that recognize the role of the observer, developments in systems theory 
(with second-order cybernetics) expose another dimension for the role of an observer. While in the 
interpretive tradition the observer is conceived of as an active agent in the construction and 
interpretation of meaning, systems theory (in the tradition of second-order cybernetics and 
Luhmann) sees the observer as a contingent construct itself that can be subsumed into another 
observation. This opens the possibility of “observing observers” and creates fascinating 
opportunities that can deepen the interpretive tradition and allow us to develop further observer-
relative distinctions through which meaning can be interpreted. An example of this can be found 
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in Luhmann’s (2000) book The Reality of Mass Media where the role of the observer is observed 
itself. 
 
3. Specifics of Luhmann’s Instance of Systems Science 
 
Niklas Luhmann embraced and further developed the basics of systems science, particularly 
with regard to its application to society. Luhmann’s work is complicated and challenging, but he 
provided the following diagram that usefully and clearly lays out his conceptualization of systems 
(Luhmann, 1990, p. 9; Moeller, 2006): 
 
 
Figure 1: Luhmann’s conceptualization of systems  
 
We approach this diagram as presenting Luhmann’s ontology of systems, where we will devote 
the most attention to social systems. “Living systems” refer to biological entities. “Psychic 
systems” refer to the minds of human individuals. 
“Social systems” are communication systems, where Luhmann does not define communication 
simply as human individuals exchanging messages with one another through language, but instead 
regards communication as a process involving “a unity of announcement (Mitteilung), information 
(Information), and understanding (Verstehen)” (Moeller, 2006, p. 22), where the translation from 
German to the English term “announcement” has also instead been “utterance” (Seidl, 2009, p.28). 
Notice that this conception of communication recognizes that the understanding developed by a 
person who is listening (or reading a text) may diverge from what is intended by the person who 
is speaking (or has authored the text). This conception of communication also recognizes non-
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verbal communication through interactions as in, for example, first, the economic system, where 
the interaction (i.e. economic communication) involves the “satisfaction of needs” and the 
meaning (or what Luhmann calls the “code”) is expressed through the unity of the distinction 
between “payment/non-payment”; second, the legal system, where communication involves the 
“regulation of conflicts” and the meaning or code is in terms of “legal/illegal”; and third, the 
political system, where communication involves the “practical application of collectively binding 
decisions” and the meaning or code is in terms of “government/opposition” (Moeller, 2006, p.29). 
In this regard, “codes” are binary distinctions that encapsulate the identity of a core system in 
society and support communication across all of its subsystems. Furthermore, according to 
Luhmann’s ontology, such core systems (labeled by Luhmann as “function systems”) include the 
aforementioned economic system, legal system, and political system; these are all systems that 
have been differentiated in society on the basis of unique bottom-to-top inventions, and all of them 
are supported in their autopoietic re-production by the function of communication. Each is also a 
communication system.  
“Organizations,” as another form of social system, also conduct communication, but Luhmann 
specifically conceptualizes organizations as conducting the communication of decisions, and 
hence are “systems of decisions” (Moeller, 2006, p. 31). 
“Interactions” are yet another form of social system, but are short-lived and “typically operate 
on a ‘face-to-face’ level and presuppose physical presence” (Moeller, 2006, p. 30). 
Significantly and counter-intuitively, human individuals per se are not constituent parts of 
Luhmann’s social systems. Rather, Luhmann locates actual human individuals in the environment 
of social systems – in particular, note the placement of “psychic systems” next to, and outside of, 
social systems in the diagram above. Seidl and Becker describe it in this way (Seidl & Becker, 
2009, p. 29): “Luhmann clearly distinguishes between social systems and human beings (psychic 
systems): social systems reproduce themselves on the basis of communications, and psychic 
systems on the basis of thoughts. Both systems are operatively closed to each other and can merely 
cause mutual perturbations in each other.” 
 
Luhmann recognizes that human minds, as “psychic systems,” can produce 
announcements/utterances, be the source of information, and develop understanding. Luhmann’s 
systems theory is particularly relevant to those information-systems researchers who subscribe to 
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interpretivism and social theory. First, with regard to interpretivism, Ramage and Shipp point out 
Luhmann’s debt to Husserl (Ramage & Shipp, 2009, p. 13): “The work of the phenomenologist 
Edmund Husserl was crucial to Luhmann’s work, especially the centrality he placed on the concept 
of meaning – our understanding and interpretation of ideas.” Second, with regard to social theory, 
Luhmann’s rendering of a social system with an existence beyond human individuals has its 
analogues in other social theory. Lee (2004, p.9) has similarly conceptualized “social” as follows: 
 
[S]ocial theory is not so much about human individuals as it is about shared, socially 
constructed institutions that endure even when the individuals who are momentarily 
present are replaced by new ones. … The things that stay the same, or at least change at 
a much slower pace than the turnover of people, would be social objects that include the 
organization’s culture, its social structure, its standard operating procedures, many of its 
business processes, its folklore and its norms for behaviour. In this alternative 
conceptualization, … social theory would more properly be about extra-individual 
entities such as culture and social structure than directly about individuals.  
 
Lee’s conception of the social as being extra-individual, which is a restatement of a foundational 
concept in sociology, aligns perfectly with Luhmann’s conception of what a social system is. Key 
features of Luhmann’s systems theory worth emphasizing are: 
 
• System/Environment: For Luhmann, the environment is not a residual category (here 
system, there environment), but constitutive of the existence of the system. The two are 
structurally coupled and one cannot exist without the other. The distinction between 
system/environment (as a unit) is then replicated internally within the system: By way of 
what Luhmann calls “re-entry,” the system copies the distinction into itself (where this is an 
example of “self-reference,” described below). Significantly, from the perspective of any 
given system (such as the social system), its environment includes other systems with which 
it interacts.  
 
• Autopoiesis: In seeking to describe the self-organizing re-creation of the cell, the biologist 
Humberto Maturana originally introduced the concept of autopoiesis as a replacement for the 
concept of circularity. He drew upon Aristotle’s distinction between praxis (an actual event 
that includes its purpose in itself) and poiesis (that which produces something external to 
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itself). Luhmann then generalized Maturana’s conception of autopoiesis so that it could be 
useful for describing self-organization in social systems and other non-biological systems 
(Maturana & Varela, 1998). Some, but not all, systems exhibit the feature of autopoiesis. 
“The autopoietic system is one that produces itself. It is perhaps best understood in contrast 
to an allopoietic system, such as a factory, which takes in materials and uses them to produce 
something other than itself” (Buchanan, 2010). 
 
• Communication: Although communication has already been mentioned, its centrality in the 
work of Luhmann calls for elaboration. Luhmann considers society as the only closed system, 
where it is closed by the function of communication. In Luhmann’s ontology, human beings 
are outside of this closed system, which means that, as a result, they cannot communicate; 
this leads to Luhmann’s locution that “only communication can communicate” (Luhmann, 
2002, p.169).  This seemingly surprising locution (humans cannot communicate) is purely a 
definitional issue on Luhmann’s part who reserves the term communication for the larger 
mechanism (utterence/information/understanding) that communication involves. The 
depiction of communication as autonomous “must be considered as Luhmann’s own way of 
decentering the subject” (Seidl & Becker, 2006, p.20). This limits the participatory role of 
people in the working of the mechanism and does not remove human beings from Luhmann’s 
theory altogether (as illustrated previously in Figure 1, Luhmann includes psychic systems). 
The significance of this must be stressed: in Luhmann’s framework, “what we experience as 
our own mind operates as an isolated autopoietic system. There is no conscious link between 
one mind and another. There is no operational unity of more than one mind as a system, and 
whatever appears as a consensus is the construct of an observer, that is, his own achievement” 
(Luhmann, 1994, p.372). Hence, humans may trigger the mechanism of communication, 
involving announcement/utterance, information, and understanding but Luhmann’s 
definition highlights the asymmetry between communication itself and the cognitive entities 
that stimulate such communication.  
 
• Self-reference: As a unique form of what Luhmann calls “re-entry,” self-reference denotes 
the ability of systems to refer to themselves and their constituent components, as well as the 
ability to replicate the system/environment distinction internally. Social systems are capable 
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of both self-reference and other-reference (relating and referring to their environment). There 
are various classifications for self-referential systems (e.g. neutral meaning, biological 
meaning, second-order cybernetics meaning). Luhmann subscribes to the last where an 
organization collects information about its own functioning and this in turn can contribute 
towards a change of its functioning (Geyer, 2002).  
 
By weaving aspects from different strands of systems theory into a systems theory that 
specifically includes social systems, Luhmann can be said to have elevated systems theory as a 
tool for the description of complex problems, as well as to have consolidated systems theory. All 
of the features of systems theory described in the preceding section, “Some Basics of Systems 
Science in General,” are inherited in Luhmann’s systems theory. 
 
4. A set of requirements for a systems theory to satisfy  
 
Based on our preceding discussion of some basics of systems science in general and Luhmann’s 
systems theory in particular, we offer the following as a set of requirements for a theory to satisfy 
in order to be considered a systems theory. Given the extensive diversity of systems approaches, 
the requirements we offer make up but one possible set, where the set is sufficient to be illustrative 
of systems theorizing. The set consists of three requirements from general systems theory and three 
requirements from Luhmann’s systems theory, where we have selected the latter three so as to be 
compatible with the former three. In doing so, we also acknowledge that there are differences 
between systems traditions and that rendering different branches of systems theory through 
common systemic principles is beyond the scope of the present paper. However, we would like to 
point out that the requirements we have selected are at a higher-level of theoretical abstraction and 
largely cut across different systems approaches (e.g. the distinction between system/environment 
is fundamental to all systems approaches). Thus, we set out to derive three requirements from the 
earlier discussion on general systems theory (GST) and three requirements from the discussion on 
Luhmann’s systems theory (LST). 
 
4.1. GST: Requirement to recognize that “the whole is more than the sum of the parts” 
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Lee (2010, p.341) formulates this requirement as follows: “To borrow an analogy from 
chemistry, the constituent parts of a system are like the reactive elements making up a compound, 
not the inert elements making up a mixture.…a system is greater than the mere concatenation of 
its constituent subsystems.”  A system (like a compound) comes to have properties different from 
the respective properties of the individual subsystems (or the individual elements) that have reacted 
to each other in forming it.  H20 can be a liquid even when the H and O forming it are gases.  An 
ERP can be a failure even when the components forming it (including the hardware, software, and 
networks) are each successful when tested individually. 
One way to demonstrate that a systems theory satisfies this requirement is by showing that the 
same component, when in different combinations with different components with which it 
interacts, is theorized to manifest different properties. For instance, an ERP consisting of the same 
configuration of hardware, software, and data structures can be theorized to be a success in one 
company but a failure in another. The different business context establishes itself as a social 
environment to the technical system and in doing so triggers different structural couplings between 
the same configuration of hardware/software/data and its human-activity context. What we 
casually call an “information system” is therefore, in this light, an emergent phenomenon.  
Another way to demonstrate this is by showing the existence of non-unidirectional relationships 
between components or variables. This can include bidirectional relationships between pairs of 
components (i.e., each component in the pair directly impacts the other component) as well as 
certain mediating relationships in which a variable has an impact on a chain of other variables 
which, in turn, ultimately has an impact on the original variable itself. The presence of such non-
unidirectional relationships also effectively serves to demonstrate not only that the whole is more 
than the sum of the parts, but also that the parts cannot be understood by studying the whole alone 
and that the parts are dynamically interrelated or interdependent. 
 
4.2. GST: Requirement to recognize “goal seeking,” which is that “systemic interaction must 
result in some goal or final state to be reached or some equilibrium point being approached” 
 
To demonstrate that a systems theory satisfies this requirement involves identifying what 
constitutes the system’s goal, final state, or equilibrium. In biology, for a cell, this could be a 
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homeostatic equilibrium. In economics, for a business firm, this could be the point where marginal 
cost is equal to average cost. For many systems, the goal could simply be survival. 
Another way to demonstrate that a systems theory satisfies this requirement involves, first, 
identifying the system’s components and the relationships among them and, second, showing how 
they have been structured or programmed so that their interactions overall strive to reach or achieve 
a goal, final state, or equilibrium. Of course, different observers could simply observe that the 
system is seeking different goals. In this regard, the requirement to recognize “goal seeking” does 
not refer to a fixed or deterministic role but to an observer-dependent condition. The role of the 
observer in this context is primary and supersedes all others. Whenever a property like “goal 
seeking” is perceived as an objective property of the system, the reader must always consider that 
objectivity is merely a “state where the observer has been abstracted away” (Angell & Demetis, 
2010, p.114). Luhmann prompts us to “re-introduce the observer” and always reflect on the idea 
that “whatever is observed is observed by an observer, who cuts up reality in a certain way in order 
to make it observable” (Luhmann, 1995, p. xxxiv).  
 
4.3. GST: Requirement to recognize the “transformation process” by which a system “must 
transform inputs into outputs” in order to attain its goal, and the accompanying 
“complexity” and “hierarchy” to which the demands of such processing can lead in the 
system’s architecture 
 
Information systems scholars who have taught coding in one or another third-generation 
programming language (such as COBOL, C++, Java or PASCAL) are familiar with the “input-
process-output” triumvirate, where data are inputted to the “computer program,” where the 
programming steps serve to process the data, and where the results from the processing are then 
outputted from the program. This is not the general case, but an instantiation, of the transformation 
process found in any system, where what is inputted, processed or transformed, and outputted is 
not restricted to data. In this analogy, the components and relationships within the program/system 
can grow in complexity as the requirements imposed on what the processing is required to achieve 
also increases. As the complexity increases, it is addressed by the system’s 
development/evolution/alteration into a set of subprograms/subsystems that, therefore, forms a 
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hierarchy of systems and also that, through interactions among themselves, satisfy the 
requirements imposed on the system as a whole. 
To demonstrate that a systems theory satisfies this requirement involves identifying what is 
being inputted to the system, what the system is transforming, what the system is outputting, and 
how the system is processing the input into the output. 
 
4.4.  LST: Requirement to recognize “self-reference” and “autopoiesis” 
 
For a system to be self-referential involves the identification of processes or indeed any other 
mechanisms through which the system collects information about itself and its own functioning, 
where this in turn can contribute to a change in its functioning. For a system to be autopoietic 
involves how the system reproduces itself. In a sense, “self-reference” is the fuel that drives the 
autopoietic reproduction of systems; self-reference is a more general and abstract concept than that 
of autopoiesis. The following two additional LST requirements pertain to self-referential, 
autopoietic systems. 
 
 
4.5. LST: Requirement to recognize the “system/environment” distinction and its 
ramifications 
 
To satisfy this requirement involves accepting that the environment is not merely external to 
the system but also constitutive of the system, as well as considering how the environment and 
system are structurally coupled, how one cannot exist without the other, and how the distinction 
between the system and the environment is replicated within the system by “re-entry.” 
 
4.6. LST: Requirement to recognize “communication”  
 
To satisfy this requirement involves showing examples of communication in the form of 
announcement/utterance (Mitteilung), information (Information), and understanding (Verstehen) 
where the examples can involve both verbal and nonverbal communication. The understanding 
held by the person or entity making the announcement/utterance (Mitteilung) need not match the 
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understanding (Verstehen) developed by the other person or entity. This requirement also requires 
showing communication mechanisms or channels that exist apart from the human beings (i.e., the 
psychic system) that use them. 
 
5. A set of requirements for a systems theory to satisfy: An illustration with Demetis’ case 
study on Anti-money laundering information systems  
 
     The study presented by Demetis (2010, p. 341), in which the role of information systems in 
monitoring Money Laundering (ML) is examined through the case of “Drosia Bank,” can help us 
illustrate the points presented in the previous section. This brief analysis is no substitute for 
Demetis’ own in-depth case study of IS complexity, but it provides a way for us to apply, for 
purposes of illustration, what systems science is. It is initially important, however, that we lay 
down the context and some critical terminology.  
Financial institutions are compelled by both national and international legislation to monitor 
customers for potential ML behavior. Banks usually identify such suspicious behavior not only by 
manual means (e.g. detecting a customer’s suspicious physical transaction in a bank branch), but 
also by using various information systems (in this case, a Case Management System or CMS, a 
Messaging/Communication System, and a Transaction Monitoring System or TMS). When a ML-
alert is raised about a customer (either a technology-generated alert by the TMS or by a member 
of staff from the branch network of the bank), an analyst investigates the alert further and decides 
whether it indeed merits suspicion. This judgment is based upon a thorough review of a customer’s 
financial position with the bank and aims at examining the customer’s broader transacting 
behavior. If the customer is considered to be a suspect for ML by the analyst, then the case against 
the customer is escalated internally and the bank’s Money Laundering Reporting Officer (MLRO) 
is called to make a final decision. The role of the MLRO is critical as he or she is the only 
authorized individual that sits at board-level and can submit a formal Suspicious Activity Report 
(SAR) to the national Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) of the country. The FIU makes the final 
decision on whether to forward the SAR to the prosecution authorities (and the FIU can also 
request additional information from other local banks, insurance companies, tax-authorities, etc., 
in support of the investigation). Anti-Money Laundering (AML) investigations can become more 
complex when multiple jurisdictions are involved. With money launderers attempting to obfuscate 
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the money trail deliberately, the success of the broader AML system has been very limited in 
securing convictions and recovering assets (Calderoni, 2015). 
 
5.1. Requirement to recognize that the “whole is more than the sum of its parts”  
 
If the three different information systems that were examined in the Drosia Bank case are 
considered as distinct and independent subsystems (i.e., as “elements” in a “mixture”) making up 
the AML-related IS-infrastructure, then it would not be possible to account for phenomena 
observed as emerging from the whole or “compound” system that the three individual systems 
constitute. By considering their interactions, we can appreciate the conditions that emerge when 
we view the three systems in relation to each other. In one example, suspicious cases are registered 
in the Case Management System of the AML team where they are assigned a unique code if they 
originate from a specific branch; this allows for the identification of the branch and the compiling 
of statistics at the regional level. This also allows one to observe how well the branch identifies 
possible ML. However, a limitation of the CMS is that it does not account for mergers of branches. 
Once, when the bank requested a software modification to account for this, the company to which 
the software development had been outsourced responded that they could not fix this issue without 
a complete redesign; the bank decided not to pursue this for cost reasons. The consequence was 
that, after a merger, no-longer existing branches continued to exist virtually (Demetis, 2010, pp. 
72-73). This quirk in the CMS had an impact on other systems, including the transaction 
monitoring system (TMS), which then needed to be configured to accommodate “virtual 
transactions.” In other words, the result was that the TMS’s own operations then became 
transformed. Whereas members of staff from the obsolete branches had moved on and had become 
a part of the internal money laundering reporting structures of other branches, the TMS still 
attributed their activities to their original branches. Through this, the integrity of the compiled 
statistics was compromised. 
Another example involves staff members in account openings for new customers. In this 
situation, branch employees would not always check for previous accounts of customers and would 
assign an additional “unique” identification number for already existing customers. As a result, 
when a customer was flagged for potential ML by the TMS based on transactions they would be 
conducting under one Unique ID (e.g. by using a debit card issued under that Unique ID), the 
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suspicious case for that customer was registered in the CMS with the reported Unique ID number 
on file. But with customers having multiple “Unique IDs” due to human errors from branch-level 
staff, the investigative process became compromised. ML analysts were complaining that they had 
no confidence in extracting a customer’s overall financial position as they would have to 
consolidate all transactions corresponding to all the “Unique IDs” for a single suspect. On a 
number of occasions, as the usefulness of the Unique-ID system was jeopardized, the AML team 
was forced to resort to another information system that established communication between the 
AML group and all the branches of the bank. The AML team would then request all branches to 
check and verify whether they had accounts in the names of specific suspects. In a limited number 
of occasions, the customers that were under investigation were tipped off and withdrew all the 
funds from their accounts.  
In both of the above examples, information dependencies required for automated transaction 
monitoring were compromised. This illustrates the general idea that different information systems 
can “feed off each other.” An “isolated” problem in one subsystem becomes an element in a 
complex nexus of relationships. The collective or “compound” information system, which emerges 
from these interactions, is furthermore inextricably bound with the social context in which it is 
embedded. Through the structural couplings of one information system with another, the collective 
information system represents a “whole that is more than the sum of its parts,” in the sense that 
the “whole” places demands on its subsystems that may result in emergent problems at the level 
of the whole, but also opportunities that may emerge from the expanding variety of 
interconnections made possible.   
 
5.2. Requirement to recognize “goal seeking”  
 
 In the context of Drosia Bank, if we consider the overall system to be the AML group of the 
bank, then its goal would be the identification of suspicious behavior relating to ML. In order for 
the system to accomplish this goal (and avoid financial fines and reputational risk), the AML group 
strove to balance the subsystemic goals that converged into its higher-level (or systems-level) goal-
seeking identity. A sample of such subsystemic goals involves, among others: (1) optimizing the 
capacity of manual ML-analysts to examine individual cases and (2) improving the SQL queries 
that filter transaction data in order to flag suspicious transactions. In the case of Drosia Bank, 2000 
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alerts were generated by the software every day, while the ML-analysts only had the capacity to 
investigate 100 of these alerts manually.  
Even though the bank hired more personnel to cope with the volume of technology-generated 
suspicious alerts and nearly doubled its staff, ML-analysts could only scrutinize approximately 
200 cases per day. Despite this increase, the real number of suspicious cases remained very low 
and only 10 cases per month were deemed to be really worthy of escalation (from a total of 60,000 
alerts generated by the software). This brought the True Positive Rate (TPR) of the transaction 
monitoring system to 0.017%, which was a very disappointing result. With the bank not being able 
to hire more staff, gradual improvement of this percentage (which increased to about 1-2% for the 
technology-generated alerts only) reached an equilibrium: the bank continued to experiment with 
algorithms to detect suspicious behavior and applied a risk-filter that would prioritize the 2000 
daily alerts (and allow ML-analysts to focus on the top 200 riskier cases they could handle per 
day).  
This “goal-seeking” optimization was also informed by the bank’s participation in an extranet-
based forum controlled by the vendor of the TMS; all the banks (globally) that had bought the 
same TMS would exchange views, techniques and ML typologies for optimization. As Drosia 
Bank found that the vast majority of banks reported similar – disappointing – TPR percentages, it 
did not intensify its efforts in further goal-seeking towards TPR-optimization. Of course, changes 
in the environment (e.g. legislative requirements and FIU demands or new modeling techniques) 
might prompt the bank to pursue further changes, leading to yet another (dynamic) equilibrium 
point. Hence, “goal seeking” is a dynamic process that emerges out of the structural coupling of 
any system with its environment and does not always indicate convergence into a singular goal. If 
we apply the system/environment distinction internally to any given system then “goal seeking” 
can also be viewed as a process of internal negotiation within an organizational subsystem (as 
described above for the AML department of Drosia bank) and can also incorporate conflicting 
“goal seeking” perspectives (e.g. how regulatory expectations for continuing improvement in 
targeting ML might diverge from the bank’s decisions to adjust ML profiling based on internal 
restrictions).  
 
5.3. Requirement to recognize the “transformation process” by which a system “must 
transform inputs into outputs” in order to attain its goal  
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 In the case of any bank that seeks to optimize the identification of ML suspects, the 
transformation process can be described in the following sequence: inputs come in the form of raw 
financial transaction data (generated by customers or other parties as they transact with the bank); 
the process occupying the logical space between inputs and outputs is the fundamental identity of 
the transformation process – in the case of Drosia Bank, it consisted of algorithmic models (e.g., 
SQL queries) that encapsulated the abstractions of suspicious behavior and were applied to input 
in the form of raw transaction data, where this included sanction list data (e.g. issued by the EU or 
the US government) along with names of suspects (mostly terrorist and politically exposed 
persons) that needed to be checked (Demetis, 2010, pp. 94-95), and general rules that attempted to 
categorize and spot money laundering behavior; and finally, the application of such algorithmic 
models to the raw transaction data result in the outputs – identification of the potential suspects for 
money laundering that then needed to be checked thoroughly by ML-analysts so that the suspicions 
could be substantiated.  
Of course, we need to recognize that this process is dependent on how the system is identified 
and designated by an observer. As any definition of a system is observer-relative, a different 
observer could identify the whole bank as the system (instead of the AML department in this 
paragraph). In that case the input would be everything that is described above and the relevant 
output would be the communication act of SARs to the FIU. Changing observer perspectives not 
only recognizes that whatever observed reality we may distill in the concept of the system can be 
carved out differently (as far as ontology is concerned), but also carries practical significance for 
the transformation of input into output, by recognizing the transcendence of this process from one 
identified system to the other. In our case and at the level of the AML department, the 
transformation process is guided by algorithms that encapsulate ML behavior and transform raw 
transactions into suspected transactions. If we switch perspective to the level of the entire bank 
then the transformation process converts raw transactions into SARs.  
 
 
 
5.4. & 5.5. Requirements to recognize “self-reference,” “autopoiesis” and the 
“system/environment” distinction 
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Where we consider the system to be the bank’s AML department, the system/environment 
distinction manifests itself in two ways. First, there is an internal environment (internal relative to 
the boundary of the institution of the bank; this would include all other departments within the 
bank excluding AML). Second, there is an external environment that includes everything besides 
the bank (every other institution in the financial sector, the FIU, the Central Bank, etc.). This means 
that the primary distinction between system/environment can be replicated both internally and 
externally. This may appear to complicate matters but the focus remains that the start of systems 
theoretical analysis is the recognition of the primary distinction between system/environment. It is 
this fundamental distinction between system/environment that enables a system to acquire self-
reference. In turn, self-reference becomes the first expression of autopoiesis – with the system 
organizing itself so that it can (re)create and sustain its own elements and relations. For example, 
the autopoietic expression of the AML department of Drosia bank would be based on 
(re)producing suspicious transactions that may be recognized as money laundering. If the AML 
department ceases to perform this function, it may threaten the viability of the bank (as the 
regulator may suspend or revoke the bank’s license, or even levy a financial fine like in the case 
of HSBC that received a $1.8bn penalty for non-compliance). Thus, the AML department requires 
raw transactions and behavioral ML-patterns as input so that it can continue to produce suspicious 
transactions (and maintain its raison d'être), much like a biological organism requires energy to 
maintain its existence and remain alive. The AML department maintains and re-establishes itself 
through that process while the general/abstract concept that describes the reflexive character of 
such autopoietic reproduction is the concept of self-reference: the system refers to itself and its 
processes in a reflexive way and re-arranges their interconnections (based on internal/external 
feedback) so that these can continue to maintain the system and its processes.  
 
Every autopoietic system is self-referential and self-reference is the mechanism through which 
the autopoiesis of a system can be maintained. Even though there are various definitions of self-
reference, it is important to re-state that LST is closer to the 2nd-order cybernetics tradition: this 
implies that the system “collects information about its own functioning, that in turn – can 
contribute towards a change of its functioning.” (Geyer, 2002, p. 1022)  In this context, all the 
subsystems of an autopoietic system contribute to its autopoietic reproduction and fuel its self-
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reference. In the context of the AML department, there were various ways in which it collected 
information about (and for) itself. One way involved the “exploitation” of other subsystems within 
the system of the bank; these subsystems would be perceived by the AML department as 
environments within the system itself: for example, the AML department would request data from 
the marketing department in order to use these in the process of profiling ML activities. Another 
way that the AML department would seek to use information for itself would be through re-
purposing information requests that it received from the external environment of the bank – for 
example, the AML department would carefully reflect on any requests from prosecution authorities 
and it would seek to glean financial intelligence from them for the purpose of improving its own 
profiling techniques; it would adjust its SARs reporting processes and change its own functioning 
after the FIU would reflect on the quality of submitted reports; and it would further attempt to 
enhance its capacity for analysis and change its profiling algorithms in the face of not only industry 
feedback, but also online forums where companies that have bought the same ML transaction 
monitoring software would reflect on its use/improvements/features. Through all of these 
activities, the AML department would exercise the self-referential character of its operations and 
support the self-reference of the organization.   
 
 
5.6. Requirement to recognize “communication”  
 
It is unavoidable that any analysis of the concept of communication will entail paradoxes since 
all knowledge is founded on paradox (Angell & Demetis, 2010); also, in the case of 
communication, a deconstruction may feel strongly coerced as it is usually portrayed at a highly 
abstract level. Still, the analysis of communication in the form of announcement/utterance 
(Mitteilung), information (Information), and understanding (Verstehen) is helpful in reflecting on 
the transformational ontology of whatever is being communicated within a system (or between 
system/environment). In the case of Drosia bank, we can take a single financial transaction as an 
example and consider it as an announcement that is initiated by a customer of the bank. This (and 
every other) announcement contains a variety of further “information elements” that are contingent 
upon the database structure of the bank (we can think of an organization here as inviting 
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interactions/transactions from its environment). In turn, the transactions initiated by the bank’s 
customers are accompanied by a multitude of information elements that are triggered in each case.  
In the context of transacting data, some examples would include: the value of transaction, the 
method of transaction (e.g. ATM, bank branch, e-banking), the location, the transacting code (e.g. 
cash, card, etc.), and about thirty more such elements for every single transaction. From the 
utterance, then, of a single financial transaction, which encapsulates all of the above elements, 
Information emerges as the sub-systemic selection of utterance-elements that are relevant for a 
specific purpose. For instance, the AML department in the bank (as a subsystem of the Drosia 
bank system) isolated certain elements that were more relevant for profiling money laundering 
transactions (e.g. value, location) while it ignored others.  
In this process, the AML department could include more Information from both different 
“utterance” occurrences shared by other systems in the environment of the bank (e.g. a tax 
authority sharing tax statements) and previous unselected utterance-elements from within the bank. 
Understanding then implies a dynamic feedback loop between an observer’s cognition and 
information, similar to what John Dewey has described as a “double movement of reflection” 
(Dewey, 1933). In this context, Understanding becomes a cognitive assessment of Information 
(e.g. by ML-analysts) and the latter’s connection with the subsystems’ goal-seeking identity. 
Understanding, then, for the AML department, implies an assessment of whether the selected 
utterance-elements (that its own subsystem perceives as Information) could be considered as truly 
suspicious for ML. Only then would the MLRO engage with the communication-system of 
“submitting SARs” in order to escalate the suspicion to the FIU. In such an event, the FIU would 
be forced to consider the MLRO’s filed SARs as another announcement/utterance – the starting 
point of further communication. We use the expression, “starting point” to indicate a change in the 
stakeholders participating in communication. A closer approximation for the concept of 
communication would not describe communication as a sequence of distinct entities but as a 
dynamic and adaptable stream through which different interconnecting elements of a system 
negotiated (in a self-referential manner) their own interconnections and enabled/disabled 
information couplings with other elements in their environment. In this context, Luhmann’s 
counterintuitive declaration that it is “only communication that communicates” implies that the 
structural skeleton of communication that includes the utterance, information and understanding 
triad (as analyzed above), remains independent of human beings. Of course, different human 
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beings will enable different individual interpretations as distinct cognitive observers but these 
remain instances of the general system of communication.  
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
As mentioned earlier, systems science is not so much an empirical science about phenomena in 
nature or society as it is an approach that empirical sciences (including IS research) can 
incorporate. The creation of systems theory itself has involved, among other things, a gradual 
evolutionary process of incorporating concepts from a multiplicity of scientific fields into a highly 
abstract lexicon; this convergence towards theoretical abstraction has been a long and bottom-to-
top process of synthesis. The goal that systems theory itself has been seeking has been one of 
reaching the highest levels of abstraction possible. Of course, this was not for the mere sake of 
abstraction itself, but a reflection of the need to tackle phenomena of greater complexity (e.g. social 
phenomena).  
Furthermore, the benefits that systems theory can provide to the field of information systems 
are not only restricted to a theoretical level but extend to a practical one as well, particularly when 
it comes to academia-industry interactions. Systems theory can facilitate communication between 
academia and industry that is far better than what structuration theory – to bring up just one 
example – could achieve. The success of Checkland’s (1990) Soft Systems Methodology is a 
testament to the possibility of delivering industry relevance through systems concepts. A reason 
that systems theory can bring additional value for interactions between academics and practitioners 
pertains to the following: as the development of systems theory was fuelled by many different 
disciplines in order to assist the synthesis that it promised, its lexicon evolved to include such inter-
disciplinarity. As a result, systems theory can be more easily understood by different fields as it 
transcends physics, chemistry, computer science, biology, sociology, politics, art, economics, and 
other disciplines. By lending itself to being stated in lay terms more readily than do other 
theoretical approaches, systems theory can be communicated back to IS practitioners. That is of 
particular significance for the IS community within which individuals with different scientific 
backgrounds find their home for research and/or practice.    
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Also, in the context of the case discussed in this paper, different aspects of the rich details and 
reasoning offered by the preceding Drosia Bank illustration can be incorporated in a positivist 
theory, an interpretive theory, and a design theory. A positivist theory would, however, need to 
allow the modeling of bidirectional and recursive relationships between variables. This would 
constitute a bold move for positivist IS research, as it would recognize that an “independent 
variable” in an IS context is a paradox and that variables cannot be examined as distinct and 
isolated entities. Hence, some recognition (and integration) of the reflexive interdependencies 
between variables would be a step forward.  
An interpretive theory would need to attend to the differences made by subjective meanings or 
verstehen and recognize that one can take different observing perspectives of different individuals 
in the organization or any other field setting. Perhaps the most fascinating thread for this is in 
“observing observers,” thereby conducting second-order observations that can allow for more 
elaborate (and insightful) deconstructions of IS situations. For a clear application of this, the reader 
is encouraged to look further into Luhmann’s (2000) work on The Reality of the Mass Media. 
    Also, a design theory would be required, by the web of relationships among subsystems that are 
the sine qua non of systems science, to account for the impacts of IT artifacts on social artifacts 
and other artifacts, for the impacts of the social and other artifacts on the IT artifacts, and all the 
subsequent second-order, third-order, etc., impacts of these artifacts on each other. The forgoing 
is at the level of GST. If Luhmann’s systems theory or LST is additionally followed, then the 
positivist, interpretive, or design theory could additionally apply Luhmann-defined concepts and 
systems insights. A researcher, of course, could choose to follow instead the concepts of another 
specific systems thinker, such as Checkland (2000) or Alter (2013), or indeed draw from a selected 
pool of systems concepts that would provide a theoretical platform for reflecting on specific 
phenomena. We emphasize that what we provide in this paper is not a universal set of systems 
criteria but just one possible set out of many.  
     We view the requirements of systems science as not constraining, but liberating the academic 
discipline of information systems, where systems concepts offer new or additional ways by which 
IS research can expand its ways of theorizing. Not only would the discipline then truly deserve its 
name of information systems, but it could also offer better theories with which to interpret, explain, 
and even design information systems. 
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